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the story of the CCS social enterprise: a) A Trans-National 
Corporation (TNC)’s interface with urban “hustle econo-
mies”; b) urban sanitation software versus hardware; c) scal-
ability and the grassroots “success penalty”; and d) economic 
sustainability and monetizing social value. 
The authors have been involved with CCS since June 2005, 
even before its inception, and continue today as senior advi-
sors to the organization. Both were part of the original Cornell 
University BoP Protocol pilot team sponsored by SC Johnson. 
Subsequently, Justin co-founded and co-led CCS with Joseph 
Njenga as part of his BoP innovation role at SC Johnson. 
Tatiana continued to advise CCS management and studied 
CCS as part of her 2009-2010 doctoral research focused on 
urban poverty, youth entrepreneurship and the “hustle econo-
my” of waste management. In essence, Justin has been an 
‘observing participant’ and Tatiana a ‘participant observer’.
2 Phase 1: the BoP Protocol:  
 exploration and development
In 2005, SC Johnson sponsored a Kenya-based test of the 
BoP Protocol™, a business development process created by 
Erik Simanis, Stuart Hart and diverse other collaborators to 
help large corporations engage with “Base of the [socio- 
economic] Pyramid” communities to co-create businesses of 
mutual value. The inspiration for this project came from the 
company’s deep commitment to sustainability and signiicant 
sponsorship of thought leadership towards sustainable enter-
prise. As the BoP Protocol took shape, SC Johnson lead the 
consortium by agreeing to sponsor an in-ield pilot test of 
what had until then been a purely theoretical academic exer-
cise. A team of six was assembled from outside the company 
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1 Introduction
Community Cleaning Services (CCS) is a Kenyan non-proit 
social enterprise1 dedicated to improving urban sanitation 
while creating proitable entrepreneurial opportunities for 
youth2 from low-income communities. CCS uses a microf-
ranchise distribution platform to offer an integrated model of 
awareness creation, training, quality assurance, product sup-
ply and marketing support to sanitation service providers 
who are delivering toilet cleaning services across Nairobi’s 
low-income neighbourhoods.
CCS’s current constitution–a mix of business and develop-
ment tools applied to economic and social objectives–consid-
ered as a static snapshot, is an interesting case. This article 
tracks the evolution of CCS from corporate Base of the 
Pyramid (BoP) pilot project to independent social enterprise 
in order to explore the complex liminal zone between purely 
commercial and entirely philanthropic undertakings. 
The CCS case, or story, has three phases. First was the BoP 
Protocol pilot, an exploratory and developmental stage. 
Second was a focusing and integration phase where CCS 
 deined its market offering and S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc. 
(SC Johnson), a home cleaning and pesticide products manu-
facturer, took the development lead. In the third, and current 
phase, CCS emerges as an independent non-proit social en-
terprise. The challenges faced, considerations made and bal-
ance struck throughout this evolution yield myriad lessons. 
This article focuses on four particular themes underpinning 
1 Oficially a “company limited by guarantee”
2 In Kenya, “youth” are deined as people aged 18-35, and comprise a 
majority of slum residents. 
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to be led by Erik Simanis and sponsored by the corporate 
sustainability ofice. The aim was two-fold: 1) testing the 
Protocol and 2) co-creating a BoP business for SC Johnson. 
The Protocol test was carried out in Kibera, East Africa’s 
most famous slum, through a partnership with Carolina for 
Kibera (CfK), a community-based organization with deep 
 relationships and involvement in Kibera. The Protocol pro-
cess brought together entrepreneurial Kibera youth groups, 
SC Johnson representatives and development professionals 
from several NGOs, including CfK, to co-create a new busi-
ness concept. Very different organizational and cultural con-
texts were brought together, leveraging local entrepreneurial 
energy, social capital and knowledge in combination with the 
company’s products and expertise in business, home cleaning 
and pest control. The business concept that emerged was to 
create services based on SC Johnson products that would cre-
ate new entrepreneurial and employment opportunities while 
enabling the provision of “cleaner, safer homes”.
In itself, a service concept was not new, but the conluence 
of potential economic, social and environmental beneits 
made it an innovative process, and represented major shifts 
for both SC Johnson to deliver and the community to “buy 
into”. Economically, it allowed for “micro-amortization” of 
business costs across clients reducing the price to the con-
sumer and returns to the operator. Socially, a service concept 
created more opportunities for customization and value- 
addition within the community and closer to the consumer. 
Environmentally, a service model meant that packaging went 
from being a disposable component of Cost of Goods Sold to 
being a re-usable, durable ixed capital cost, nearly eliminat-
ing packing waste from the system.
Methodologically, the in-ield phase also created the foun-
dations on which to build this new business: trust, shared 
 vocabulary, and mutual commitment to co-creating a new 
business that would generate value for the community (as 
suppliers and consumers) and for SC Johnson. Importantly, 
the “team” was now no longer just the “Protocol consultants” 
from Cornell but also committed young community members 
(later to be referred to as “entrepreneurs”) and one particu-
larly committed SC Johnson Kenya representative, Joseph 
Njenga. Essentially, a partnership had been brokered (much 
credit is owed to CfK here) and irmly established between 
SC Johnson and select young entrepreneurs.
Starting in 2006, SC Johnson and community partners be-
gan iterating business models and market offerings based on 
the service concept. Eventually, the company’s product cate-
gories deined the service areas to be explored: pest control 
and home cleaning. The irst iterations focused primarily on 
in-home insecticide spraying (a “pay per spray” model) and 
selling these services door-to-door, trying to tap into the 
youth groups’ existing garbage collection clients. 
After a year, it became clear that although the products 
were very effective (the image of thumb-sized cockroaches 
pouring out of a typical Kibera wall and dying in piles on 
the loor remains a poignant memory) something was 
wrong with the business model: the business was not mak-
ing money for the youth groups or SC Johnson, and mo-
mentum was lagging. Analysis of the irst phase yields 
 several important lessons.
The community entrepreneurs with whom we were work-
ing could not afford “sweat equity” investment because their 
daily income was required for daily living expenses: immedi-
ate cash low was critical. The business model had to  generate 
cash and proit that went directly into the operators’ pockets. 
Monthly fees and complex payment structures would not de-
liver the rapid return or security required for those living in 
the hustle economy where today’s earnings bought tonight’s 
dinner (or paid last week’s rent). Furthermore, in the income-
poor neighbourhoods where the work was being done, an ex-
treme level of caution and apprehension was applied to any 
new “scheme” that meant a consumer would part with even a 
single Kenyan Shilling. The business model needed to lever-
age existing local payment and cash collection methodolo-
gies and allow for lexibility in this critical business function 
from one area to the next. Some teams collected monthly, 
others weekly, some collected upon completion of the job, 
and others might extend credit to a customer or group of cus-
tomers because they were also garbage collection clients or 
had established trust by other means. Furthermore, there were 
important social norms concerning gender relations that 
clashed with a door-to-door ‘in-home’ service. Usually, the 
potential residential customers were women who were in or 
near the homes, while most entrepreneurs were male youth. It 
was culturally unfamiliar and potentially unacceptable to in-
vite a young man into one’s domestic space to provide a ser-
vice without the ‘man of the house’ being present. In most 
cases, men were also in control of the household budget, 
which complicated the payment process.  
Two core insights emerged in this early phase that deined 
the direction of the initiative and served as the foundation for 
what would become CCS. First, focusing on shared/commu-
nity resources would overcome the challenge of accessing 
clients’ personal living space and would further amortize the 
cost of a service across multiple consumers. Second, the busi-
ness had to deliver immediate and tangible value because 
consumers needed to be able to see or smell the difference in 
order to justify the expense. These communities had for over 
a decade become accustomed to paying for garbage collec-
tion by local entrepreneurs. The challenge for CCS was to 
similarly become part of the local waste economy and ac-
cepted household expenses. Though the cost was that of a 
single soda, a sum within reach, it was new and represented a 
signiicant share of disposable income. Even miniscule ex-
penditures on non-essential goods or services (essentially 
anything other than housing, education and food, usually pri-
oritized in that order), were considered with sceptical rigor. 
Another key insight concerned the business operations and 
local service providers. Working with pre-existing groups 
and proven entrepreneurs allowed the business to take root 
quickly and leverage existing social capital. However, most 
youth groups were too careful and sophisticated to risk their 
hard-won client-base by testing an unproven concept on 
them. In these early days, we may have over-used the term 
“social capital” in referring to the very real business asset of 
an existing client base. For the young entrepreneurs involved, 
the services being tested were interesting enough and with 
enough potential to invest time in, but not nearly established 
enough to risk the valuable relationships and trust they had 
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built with their clients. In the “hustle economy” of these 
youths’ lives, sophisticated calculations of risk and reward 
were made instantly3. The goal became to work with groups 
and entrepreneurs who had established structure, some expe-
rience of success and a vision for their business and commu-
nity, and who saw these new services as a secure addition to 
their income generating “portfolio” of activities. 
Working with and through youth groups was a crucial step 
initially, given that they had built an entire informal waste 
economy in these neighbourhoods, and had experience navi-
gating through these communities. Working with groups 
proved challenging, however, when it came to business man-
agement. Once local groups were identiied as entry points, 
the objective became partnering with an individual “entrepre-
neur” within the group who took on the leadership and coordi-
nation of the business. Given the luid reality of working 
 between the formal and informal economies, having clarity on 
roles and responsibilities proved critical. Entrepreneurial 
youth groups in these neighbourhoods had various roots as 
football teams, gangs and street-theatre troupes, to name only 
a few, and starting a new business was a leadership and or-
ganizational challenge to which many would not rise. Those 
who did were often lead by an individual, not always the over-
all group leader (or the most vocal individual), but a single 
“coordinator” who was responsible, had a vision for the new 
business and demonstrated the leadership qualities to rally 
others behind that vision. The challenge was that individuals 
like these were rare and these same qualities often meant other 
opportunities would be presented to them, especially once 
they had been involved with and “trained” by a multinational 
corporation. SC Johnson, CfK and all of us involved with 
CCS were always promoting our partners and were proud 
when they left us for greener pastures, despite the operational 
challenge loosing talent entailed. In retrospect, we should 
have better tracked this positive impact for improved under-
standing and communications, although it is  unlikely we 
would have been able to monetize it. To reduce turnover, CCS 
began selecting entrepreneurs with skills and vision but who 
were also committed to impacting their community from 
within, a strategy that included an inherent limit to each entre-
preneur’s growth, which we discuss later in this article.4
3 Phase 2: CCS market offering defined and  
 SC Johnson takes development lead
In early 2007 the second phase of CCS’ development began 
with two key events: SC Johnson took over project and 
 business leadership from the Cornell research team and the 
critical decision was made to focus the business on a micro-
franchise shared toilet cleaning offering. Critically, SC Johnson 
invested in the CCS team so that strategic decisions could be 
made quickly, locally and based on epistemic privilege. Joseph 
3 Thieme, “The ‘Hustle’ amongst Youth Entrepreneurs in Mathare’s 
 Informal Waste Economy” (Forthcoming)
4 For more CCS history see chapter 5 of Duke, D. 2011. Entrepreneurial 
Sensemaking: Building Novel Ventures in New Market Space. Unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.
Njenga, who had formally worked with SC Johnson Kenya, 
was re-engaged to lead the small “CCS Central” management 
team. SC Johnson remained the sole sponsor and the objective 
remained to develop a sustainable BoP business, consciously 
increasing and maintaining the focus and pressure. The explor-
atory phase was over, and now a viable business had to be 
 developed to justify SC Johnson’s continued investment.
CCS began to distance itself from some of the methods and 
tools it had used in the irst phase, many based on participa-
tory development as outlined in the BoP Protocol.5 The best 
example of this shift was a new “no workshops” rule. Half-
day workshops had throughout Phase 1 been a primary tool 
for needs assessment and brainstorming. Popular amongst 
development practitioners including the NGOs CCS had 
worked with, this tool sent the wrong message in this second 
phase where collective relection was no longer as important 
as testing on the ground. Holding workshops meant nobody 
was working so revenues were zero and a free lunch was in-
cluded.6 CCS management re-invented how they interacted 
with the “franchisees” in favour of in-ield, action-based 
 activities. Integrated into the induction and quality control 
processes, this new in-ield focus delivered multiple beneits. 
On-the-job training and quality-control meant revenue was 
always generated, potential clients could observe CCS’ pro-
fessionalism and rigor and CCS processes relected the core 
ethos of the hustle economy: there can be no free lunch.
CCS was originally housed at CfK’s ofices, physically 
putting the business within an NGO. As phase 2 began, CCS 
management started looking for their own modest ofices. 
CCS developed a selection and induction process that en-
sured only committed new entrepreneurs were engaged while 
simultaneously creating capacity, community awareness, cli-
ent demand and incomes right from the start. CCS focused its 
efforts on entrepreneurs/coordinators who were well known 
in their communities and able to manoeuvre through local 
politics, critically giving CCS a trusted and permanent pres-
ence in the communities. Similarly, CCS was a local partner 
entity for SC Johnson, reducing risk and navigating challeng-
ing local “issues” independently. 
There were serious concerns amongst the CCS manage-
ment team, the authors included, that many of the young 
 entrepreneurs involved would not appreciate the increased 
performance pressure and the hands-off approach (moving 
away from the NGO model). A few did leave in the transition, 
but those who remained were the more capable and commit-
ted entrepreneurs. Later, one would even admit in referring 
to this shift, “at the start you were so timid, this is business, 
it has to be tough.” We had probably underestimated our part-
ners, not yet appreciating the ‘thick skin’ of youth operating 
within the hustle economy, and had focused too much on the 
“soft” aspect of social enterprise. 
5 The BoP Protocol™ version 2 is available at www.bop-protocol.org, 
but is now somewhat outdated and outpaced by its authors’ experiences.
6 Many savvy youths in Kibera, where NGOs probably outnumber 
 toilets, refer the NGO workshops as “feeding programmes” (informal 
interview with CCS Quality Control Professional who lives outside 
Kibera, Feb 2011)
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CCS was entirely focused now on developing the supply-
chain, business processes and marketing strategies necessary 
for a shared-toilet cleaning business. SC Johnson R&D iden-
tiied the optimal existing formulas of Toilet Duck™ and 
Mr. Muscle™ cleaners. CCS imported these to Kenya from 
SC Johnson’s Egypt facility in barrels, not cases of consumer 
packaging. Bulk importation was an important business ad-
aptation for the CCS service model that “closed the loop” on 
packaging waste within the CCS business allowing re-use of 
all packaging, reducing CCS’ environmental impact; and cost 
reductions, improving CCS’ inancial performance. CCS 
teams now operated daily, selling and delivering cleaning 
services to shared residential toilets (ie accessed by several 
families), schools, clinics, restaurants and bars. Because the 
toilets were shared, so was the cost of the service. The aver-
age residential client paid $0.18 per week, which was less 
than a commonly consumed bottle of soda. Furthermore, 
based on its success, local governments and NGOs started 
asking CCS to get involved with the management and clean-
ing of community and public (pay-per-use) toilets.
From 2007 to the end of 2009, CCS and SC Johnson ex-
perimented and learned what did and didn’t work. At one 
point CCS was working with over 20 independent entrepre-
neurs and over a hundred public toilets. CCS now had at 
least a presence in most of Nairobi’s low-income communi-
ties and we noticed an important aspect to urban sanitation: 
subsidized sanitation infrastructure–often referred to as 
“hardware”–was consistently in various states of danger-
ously  putrid disrepair and misuse. In contrast, CCS had 
 decided on a “software” approach, focusing on making the 
toilets already in the communities operational, safer, cleaner 
and perhaps even pleasant to use. SC Johnson’s expertise in 
cleaning and its commitment to the communities where CCS 
was working were critical because “sanitation software” is a 
challenging investment. It is not as tangibly technical, pho-
togenic, or simple to ‘install’ and verify as other sanitation 
“hardware” solutions (interventions often more familiar in 
rural areas where the conditions are less complicated). 
CCS, supported by SC Johnson, saw the need to leverage 
the hardware and assets already in place, by investing in 
“sanitation software” through business and cleaning training 
for independent CCS “micro-franchisees”. The problem was 
not as much the lack of facilities as it was the condition, 
maintenance and management of existing facilities (many of 
which had become abandoned or used as a dumping ground). 
Later, the focus would include educational marketing for the 
community, the toilet users, with the aim of raising expecta-
tions, creating awareness of the dangers and costs associated 
with open defecation and dirty toilets, and changing sanita-
tion-related behaviours. 
4 Phase 3: CCS emerges as an independent  
 non-profit social enterprise
In early 2010, CCS was in an interesting but challenging posi-
tion. On the one hand, there was growing “buzz” across 
Nairobi and beyond about CCS both as a social enterprise ad-
dressing urban usai (sanitation, cleanliness, hygiene) while 
creating income opportunities for under-employed youth and, 
more locally, as a valuable cleaning service. On the other 
hand, the business was not meeting inancial objectives and 
could not be considered a viable business investment.
At the community level, the situation was best described 
by a CCS trainer, “CCS is becoming a movement. Now the 
name speaks for itself” (March 2010). CCS clients and non-
clients alike often referred to the professionalism of CCS 
teams and the use of SC Johnson’s “irst class” products. 
When probed further, the answers concerned the “sweet 
smell” of the product, the “whiteness of the bowl”, and the 
“professional” quality of the service. These visual and ol-
phatic aspects, driven by personal and social pride, stood out 
above any health beneits. Not unlike higher income con-
sumers, Nairobi’s poorest also valued having a toilet facility 
that they, their families and their guests could use without 
discomfort or shame. Furthermore, local leaders and youth 
alike recognized the value of CCS as an income generating 
opportunity and as a business that respected and valued its 
members. CCS was the only community-based business to 
provide and enforce the use of uniforms, protective gear and 
professional cleaning techniques.
Yet, CCS Central’s inancial performance lagged behind 
break-even targets and could not justify further business in-
vestment. CCS micro-franchises were proitable with reve-
nues from clients covering operating costs, including wages 
well above minimum wage, and delivering proit for re- 
investment or disbursement. On the one hand, the costs to 
CCS Central of franchisee training, follow-up and quality as-
surance were well above projections and were destroying 
proitability. On the other hand, these processes were also nec-
essary for the business, a key driver of the “buzz” and positive 
social impact generated through the establishment of high 
quality standards. Furthermore, it was clear that additional 
marketing, in the form of sanitation and hygiene campaigns, 
was necessary to create demand for the CCS service and to 
shift expectations and change behaviours around sanitation. 
CCS had become indigenous to the communities in which 
it operated by “franchising” to existing entrepreneurs and 
youth groups already operating in the informal urban econo-
mies of these communities. However, one aspect of the hustle 
economy capped the teams’ ability to grow beyond a certain 
point: territorial economic zoning. Integral to the informal 
waste economy in these low-income neighbourhoods was a 
respect for particular demarcations of economic activity. 
CCS teams were usually based on youth groups, quite often 
with historical links to gangs, and working on various forms 
of waste management. The speciic territorial zoning within 
which the teams managed and serviced a set number of resi-
dential plots carried a perceived sense of boundaries. As 
many youth entrepreneurs often explained, “you do not go 
beyond your base”. The respect for other groups’ “base” was 
clear and dangerous to contest. 
This issue was often seriously discussed in various CCS 
meetings amongst entrepreneurs. Paradoxically, the consen-
sus was that if other CCS entrepreneurs went beyond their 
base, this was not a problem (unlike for garbage collection). 
“It’s healthy competition,” they said, and a way of marketing 
the service. Some explained that it was sometimes easier to 
market CCS outside one’s immediate residential area, as it 
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made the service seem more credible if it came from the 
 outside. On the other hand, establishing trust between the 
CCS service providers and local residents took time. So 
while many teams felt comfortable being invited to complete 
a job or service a customer outside their base on a one-off 
basis, most teams worked within their zones of economic 
and social comfort. Additionally, youth groups whose social 
and economic organization included references to “hustling” 
 preferred being self-employed, working within their own 
neighbourhood where they were known, and understood the 
inextricable link between economic pursuits and social ser-
vice. Their social reputation inluenced their entrepreneurial 
success, and vice versa. The meaning of work for youth and 
the resource of (solid and human) waste in these communities 
were heavily connected with the “base” where business op-
erations took place. For CCS, the beneit of legitimacy and 
operational capacity in Nairobi’s informal communities and 
“hustle economy” carried the cost of being limited by this 
“grey” economic zoning, and having to adhere to these entre-
preneurial groups’ conceptions of territory. 
In addition to the territorial sensibilities of “the group”, 
there was also an important individual dimension to the per-
ceived “limits to growth”. Within the hustle economy, there 
was a cost to doing “too well”. There was a real psychologi-
cal limit to individual economic gain, regularly manifest as 
adamant discretion concerning income. Consciously hiding 
and subconsciously limiting one’s income was a protective 
mechanism against the risk of becoming a target for crime, 
being exploited by friends and family and social exclusion if, 
to avoid the above, one left the mtaa (‘hood’) to live else-
where. This led to a perceived “success penalty”–where suc-
cess meant having enough to meet your basic expenses in-
cluding school fees and some disposable income to upgrade 
your living standards, but NOT needing to leave the hood for 
fear of no longer belonging or being safe. At a personal level, 
the success penalty restricted individual drive to raise income 
beyond “the necessary”. For CCS, this meant that costs were 
driven by the number of CCS teams, while growth per team 
was limited by aspects of the hustle economy and the indi-
vidual success penalty. Therefore, CCS needed to fund the 
growth in the number of teams outside of its operational costs 
while creating infrastructure and partnerships that would al-
low it to effectively service a huge number of franchisees. 
CCS also had a critical marketing challenge: residents had 
become used to deplorable sanitary standards because, as 
they often put it, ni kawaida (it is usual). Based on interviews 
and focus group discussions in Mathare (one of the oldest and 
largest slums in Nairobi), residents expressed shame and 
frustration concerning the sanitation conditions in their 
neighbourhoods, but these conditions had become normal-
ized, as was dealing and living with them. The “capacity to 
aspire”7 to better, to imagine a different reality, was inhibited 
by the need to cope and “make do” with the consequences of 
unplanned urbanization, and the lack of bargaining power 
residents living in informal settlements tend to have due to 
their lack of oficial tenureship. This meant that when it came 
7 Appadurai, “The Capacity to Aspire” 
to marketing CCS, residents were very dificult to “sell” on a 
toilet cleaning service. 
Despite some success, CCS was converting only a tiny frac-
tion of the potential market into clients. Diseases like cholera, 
typhoid, and diarrhoea, which kill more than malaria or AIDS8, 
were common in the dense urban settlements where CCS oper-
ated, especially amongst children, but local residents did not 
link dirty toilets and disease. Analysis of CCS sales and mar-
keting efforts revealed that the key wasn’t about convincing 
people that CCS offered a great service, (several powerful tac-
tics had been developed to do this), it was showing the health 
value and potential health care cost-savings of a clean toilet9, 
beyond the olphatic and visual “nice to have”. CCS clients 
were consistently happy with the service, but repeat was lim-
ited because the full value was not perceived. How do you 
show a frugal client the value of disease prevention in the con-
text and time-frame of a door-to-door sale? CCS marketing 
was in a classic trap where a health “need” did not transfer into 
market demand or consumer behaviour10. The challenge was 
how to integrate a community-wide social health awareness 
campaign into a business already running “in the red”. 
 A signiicant shift in structure and strategy was required 
and CCS began mapping a hybrid structure to balance market-
based business and donor-funded NGO. SC Johnson agreed 
to support CCS in making this transition. CCS became an in-
dependent non-proit Kenyan social enterprise, technically a 
“company limited by guarantee”, no longer an LLC, and 
 began the third, and current, phase of its development. 
By early 2010, CCS had developed a valuable niche set of 
capabilities but to these it needed to add improved youth en-
trepreneur follow-up and increased, public health-focused 
communications. These were areas of social impact and val-
ue-creation that had been cost centres for CCS but which 
could be monetized through social-sector partnerships and 
contracts with organizations looking to positively engage ur-
ban youth in their communities and needing urban “sanita-
tion software”. For example, an NGO might be building a 
toilet but needing a sustainable maintenance strategy. 
Another might be looking to seed entrepreneurship or in-
come opportunities in a given community. Yet another might 
be funded to improve sanitation and hygiene. Any of these 
NGOs could contract CCS to assess the market, identify, 
train and support a local CCS team who would in turn main-
tain the NGO’s toilet and offer cleaning services throughout 
the community. As has been CCS’ experience, this would 
create new sustainable income opportunities and improve 
hygiene in the community. CCS was in a uniquely attractive 
position as it offered an established, locally trusted and 
 externally respected “entry-point” for outside institutional 
actors seeking to build on local sanitation efforts.
8 George 2008, The Big Necessity.
9 According to triangulated interviews conducted with residents and 
 local clinicians, the cost of treating a case of diahhrea was equivalent 
or higher to the average day’s wage of a slum resident, and a third of 
one household’s monthly rent.
10 Erik Simanis has written extensively on these issues and proposed 
 interesting “market creation” strategies to overcome them. See also 
Thieme 2010, pp. 13 for a description of the CCS “cost dilemma”.
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CCS and Plan International partnered in June 2010 to 
launch a pilot Urban Community-Led Total Sanitation 
(UCLTS) pilot in Mathare 10, one of CCS’ key operating ar-
eas. Plan had successfully implemented CLTS in rural areas 
of Kenya and was a leader in its application for signiicant 
community-led sanitation improvements. However, CLTS 
had not yet been successfully adapted and implemented in 
low-income urban settlements.11 CCS and Plan would work in 
partnership, funded by grants from Dutch and Australian de-
velopment agencies, to adapt CLTS techniques and methods 
to the complexities and peculiarities of an urban “slum”. The 
work is ongoing but has already achieved improvements in 
local awareness (over 5,000 residents reached), coordination 
(70 active volunteers) and action to improve sanitation (5 toi-
lets built, 6 sewers repaired). The frequency of open defeca-
tion and the use of “lying toilets” have decreased, in part due 
to increased community peer-pressure and the community-
led efforts to campaign for alternatives to these coping strat-
egies.12 Local and national government agents have taken 
 notice and are engaging with CCS and the residents of 
Mathare 10. “Hanging toilets” that drop into open sewers, 
some near schools, have been closed and demolished. Toilets 
have been built. Landlords are being engaged and, in some 
cases, shamed into improving the sanitation options they of-
fer residents. CCS teams have also seen a strong increase in 
business in the area, and many CCS members have been 
trained in CLTS methodologies. CCS’ partnership with Plan 
is deepening and expanding, showing the direction of CCS’ 
future evolution as a hybrid organization.
5 Conclusion
CCS started as a purely market-based innovation project with 
the goal of creating a new proitable BoP business. As it 
evolved, CCS moved towards a hybrid model, adding in-
creased elements of donor funding to monetize the social 
value it was generating. The future-state for CCS is to be mar-
ket-based regarding franchisee supply while donor–or social-
sector-funded for its support and sanitation awareness work. 
The organization was originally structured as a business, and 
we aim to retain its culture and DNA rooted in the private sec-
tor. These market-based roots help drive CCS’ high standards 
of effectiveness, quality and rigor and are the foundation for 
the caring but demanding relationships it has with its franchi-
sees, none of whom come to CCS expecting donations or 
hand-outs. Additionally, CCS’ evolving hybrid structure must 
be nimble in accessing social-sector  innovations and funding 
and eficient in providing social-sector deliverables (propos-
als, impact assessment, reports). 
Implicit in this new “hybrid” path for CCS is a broadened 
notion of “sanitation marketing,” coupling a public health 
11 CLTS had been attempted in an certain urban area in parts of Asia, 
however CLTS methodology, experience and success has for the most 
part taken place in the rural context.
12 Flying toilets occur when residents do not have or fear trying to use 
toilets outside their homes so they defecate in bags, tie them off, and 
throw them on local open dumps or rooftops. These “lying toilets” are 
a common scourge across low-income communities in Nairobi.
message with a campaign for youth entrepreneurship and in-
come generation. At a time when both the issues of urban 
sanitation and youth under-employment have become crucial 
development challenges, CCS continues to offer the possi-
bility of turning these two challenges into opportunities. 
Until now, it has happened at a small, locally meaningful 
scale. Situated within the extreme context of urban poverty 
and youth ‘hustle’ where the line between entrepreneurship 
and crime is often blurred, CCS has offered a kind of work 
that both its within the youth hustle economy and provides a 
network of mentorship, training and support that goes beyond 
business. Moving forward, the key will be to strike the difi-
cult but fascinating balance between expanding and meeting 
the expectations of the community residents, local entrepre-
neurs, and institutional actors involved. These expectations 
and the very idea of what constitutes positive impact are 
 inevitably articulated in different ways, and may even some-
times diverge. It is the combination of continued critical 
 relection and action-based efforts that will shape CCS’ sus-
tainability in every sense of the word. With the majority of 
humans now living in urban settings and the majority of pop-
ulation growth occurring within low-income communities, 
CCS has massive potential both as a hybrid social enterprise 
but, importantly, also as a model from which others can learn 
as they look to combine market– and donor-based approaches 
in operating in this emerging, challenging but critical arena.
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